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Key Points 
The Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) is expected to fail the 2016 EU-wide stress test 
conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA), whose results are due to be presented 
Friday, 29 July 2016. When taking a closer look at the bank, it becomes apparent that the bank has 
so far failed or nearly failed all the EU-wide supervisory exercises that have been undertaken in 
the past six years. Almost every time the bank has managed to raise just enough capital, including 
public funds already contributed twice by the Italian government, to close the capital shortfalls or 
meet the threshold. This allowed the bank to live on the edge, which is costly to society. 
Supervisory, resolution and competition authorities should therefore discourage banks from 
following in MPS’ path of doing the minimum required, by imposing extensive recapitalisation 
requirements with a proper resolution. 
Policy Recommendations 
• Supervisors should subject banks that perform poorly in several consecutive supervisory 
exercises to additional scrutiny. 
• The stress test is unlikely to be very helpful in the case of MPS since it looks at the impact 
of an adverse scenario on earnings, and not the true value of existing non-performing loans, which 
constitute the real issue. Accordingly, the supervisor should use its discretionary powers to 
undertake a detailed assessment to determine the current market value of the bank’s loan book. 
• Bail-in of retail investors in subordinated debt also seems feasible since most of the 
instruments are held by the wealthiest families. Moreover, in the event that the instruments were 
mis-sold, the government could compensate them. The conduct-of-business supervisors should 
closely follow the sales practices of bail-inable instruments to avoid further mis-selling and ensure 
that banks now inform their clients, take the risk-profile into account and diversify their portfolios. 
• The supervisory, resolution and competition authorities should impose the standard 
procedure as foreseen in the resolution scheme with bail-in to cover the losses and arrange the 
recapitalisation. If the resolution authority faces some obstacles in the execution of the bail-in, it 
could use its discretionary powers to prioritise certain creditors. 
• The authorities should use their experience to correct the weaknesses in the resolution 
framework (e.g. cross-holding of bail-in instruments, exclusion of politically sensitive exposures), 
improve ongoing work (e.g. recovery and resolution plans, setting MREL-levels) and prepare for 
future resolution cases (e.g. sufficiently high recapitalisation). 
                                                     
* Willem Pieter De Groen is a Research Fellow at CEPS in Brussels and an Associate Researcher at the 
International Research Centre on Cooperative Finance (IRCCF) of HEC Montréal. 
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espite raising the capital required to cover the shortfalls in previous exercises, the capital 
cushions of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) have remained relatively thin. This makes 
the bank more vulnerable for new setbacks, such as the large losses it is likely to face on its 
portfolio of non-performing loans (NPLs). Although it has been clear for some time that MPS is unlikely 
to be able to solve the issues with its NPLs on its own, the authorities are reluctant to intervene and are 
presumably waiting for the results of the stress test before officially intervening. These authorities 
should eschew taking semi-soft measures again, which are likely to prolong MPS’ struggle. 
Acquisition of Banca Antonveneta 
Looking more closely at MPS, it is clear that the Italian bank has been living on the edge for 
years now. It was traditionally a foundation-owned savings bank, but was converted to a 
listed bank in 1995. Afterwards the bank rapidly expanded its activities both through new 
autonomous initiatives and acquisitions, most notably Banca Antonveneta just before the 
Great Financial Crisis hit in 2007. The acquisition price of €9 billion (of which approximately 
€5.9 billion goodwill) was more or less similar to MPS’ total equity at the time the deal was 
announced. The acquisition was not particular successful. MPS had, for example, to write-
down almost all of the goodwill that was created through the acquisition in recent years. The 
write-downs of €4.3 billion and €1.5 billion in 2011 and 2012, respectively, contributed to the 
large negative returns on equity posted by MPS in recent years (see Figure 1), but they had a 
limited impact on the bank’s capital position due to an exemption of goodwill from regulatory 
capital.1  
Figure 1. Return on equity in the EU, Italy and MPS, 2007-15 (%) 
 
Note: The figure shows the return on equity for the European Union (EU), Italy (IT) and Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena (MPS). 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ECB consolidated banking data and financial statements of Banca Monte dei 
Paschi. 
 
                                                     
1 The write-down of goodwill can even improve the regulatory capital position of Italian banks by up 
to 30% of the write-down because of a reduction in the taxation of the profits or tax credits that are 
being created. When the tax credits are not directly claimable, they are exempted from the regulatory 
capital. 
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In turn, the acquisition itself had an impact on the capital position of MPS. Although the bank, 
among others, issued new capital and increased the leverage to finance the deal, the capital 
cushions of the bank were thin and of a weaker quality after the completion of the acquisition. 
The total capital of the bank was 9.3% at the end of 2008, whereas 8.0% was required. 
Moreover, the acquisition was paid for by the issuance of €6 billion ordinary shares (core 
equity Tier I) and €2.2 billion new subordinated capital instruments (Tier II regulatory capital) 
as well as retained earnings. In order to strengthen its capital position, the bank applied for 
(voluntary) capital support from the Italian government. MPS issued €1.9 billion so-called 
Tremonti-bonds to the government in 2009. The conditions for this intervention were 
relatively light. The support was only granted to improve the capitalisation of banks that at 
least appeared on paper to be solvent and not to absorb losses. Whether MPS was actually 
solvent at that time is questionable. The bank had, for instance, been involved in a derivative 
construction that hid some losses. This derivative contract was not to the auditor or the 
supervisor in 2009, and was only uncovered in 2013. 
Figure 2. Balance sheet structure of MPS, 2000-15 (€bn) 
 
Note: The financial statements up to 2003 are based on IT GAAP, whereas IFRS has been applied since. The gross 
non-performing customer loans are estimated based on the net non-performing customer loans and the provision 
ratios. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on financial statements of Banca Monte dei Paschi. 
 
Stress tests and capital exercises 
The government’s support to MPS and the bank’s hiding of losses via the derivative 
transaction appeared to be essential to allow the bank to just barely pass the stress test 
undertaken by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in 2010 (see Annex 
Table 1 in the Annex). Hence, without the €1.9 billion in government support, it would have 
noted a capital shortfall of €1.7 billion. In all the four EU-wide stress tests and capital exercises 
that followed afterwards, MPS failed or tricks were used to pass. In 2011, the bank was subject 
to both a stress test and capital exercise of the EBA. It narrowly passed the stress test (surplus 
€1.4 billion) through the issuance of new capital instruments (€1.8 billion) while the exercise 
was undertaken. But it failed the capital exercise in which MPS noted a capital shortfall of €3.3 
billion due to a sovereign portfolio whose market value was below the book value. By the cut-
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off date, the bank had a very concentrated government debt portfolio that consisted almost 
exclusively of Italian government debt and was about twice the regulatory capital. MPS had 
a total gross exposure to all EEA governments of €30.9 billion, of which €0.5 billion was to 
other governments than the Italian. It was also the Italian government that covered most of 
the losses with a new capital injection of €2 billion2 and approximately €1 bn through 
deleveraging. The effort, however, was insufficient to meet the capital threshold when the 
capital exercise was finalised in June 2012, due to large loan losses in the meantime.  
MPS also failed the combination of the EBA-EU wide stress test and ECB’s asset quality review 
in 2014, i.e. the stress test and asset quality review ahead of the start of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM). It noted a capital shortfall of €4.3 billion. In response, the bank reduced its 
exposure and issued new capital instruments, which it also used to repay the government 
funds. The Italian government currently only has 4% of the ordinary share capital remaining 
in the bank.3 In 2014 and 2015, the bank issued in total about €8 billion in new ordinary shares 
and reduced the capital requirement with another €1 billion through deleveraging in terms of 
both assets and risk-weighted assets.  
Figure 3. Regulatory capital ratios of MPS, 2000-15 (€bn) 
 
Note: The total assets up to 2003 are based on IT GAAP, while afterwards IFRS has been applied. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on financial statements of Banca Monte dei Paschi. 
 
Overall, the total assets of MPS declined about 30% from €241 billion in 2011 to €169 billion in 
2015 (see Figure 2). The main deleveraging in terms of risk-weighted assets had at that time 
already taken place. Hence, the average risk-weight decreased from 70.0% in 2007 to 45.7% in 
2010 (see Figure 3). Afterwards the risk-weight decreased to 41.9% in 2015. In order to make 
the deleveraging possible, the bank had to de facto stop lending to the real economy. Customer 
loans decreased by about a quarter from €147 billion in 2010 to €111 billion in 2015.  
                                                     
2 MPS received in total € 3.9 billion capital support from the Italian government, but €1.9 billion was 
used to repay the Tremonti bonds. 
3 The Italian government obtained the share capital in exchange for the accrued interest on the capital 
instruments. 
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Non-performing loans 
Despite the measures to increase the regulatory capital, the margins remained thin, making 
MPS more vulnerable for issues with the NPLs. MPS is not the only bank dealing with a 
sizeable NPL portfolio. In fact, NPLs constitute an important threat to banking-sector stability 
in several European countries. Based on the harmonised definition for NPLs by the European 
Banking Authority in 2013,4 Italy, together with Cyprus, Greece, Slovenia, Portugal and 
Ireland, are among the countries where many banks have already been resolved with the 
highest level of NPLs in the EU (see Figure 4). The NPLs are in particular concentrated in the 
loan portfolios of small- and medium-sized enterprises and to a lesser extent of households. 
The NPLs to large corporates are in general the least numerous among the non-financial 
corporations and households. The differences between the countries are due to differences in 
economic structure and situation, bank lending policies as well as effectiveness in nudging 
payments and dealing with distressed debt, but also more structural differences in legal 
systems, court procedures and tax regimes (EBA, 2016). 
Figure 4. NPL ratio & coverage ratio, March 2016 (weighted average) 
 
*Data for December 2015. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on EBA (2015). 
 
More specifically for Italy, the stock of NPLs has according to the Italian central bank 
increased rapidly in recent years to €360 billion or 18% gross NPLs at the end of 2015 (Banca 
d’Italia, 2016). Besides the economic headwinds, the NPLs in Italy are relatively high due to 
the inefficient court proceedings, limited outside court options and disincentives in the tax 
system to write-down loan losses, and no deep secondary market. The Italian government has 
recently taken some measures aimed at improving the NPL market. These include reforming 
the insolvency and foreclosure proceedings, reducing the time in which loan-losses can be 
deducted for tax purposes and the tax that needs to be paid on the acquisition of fore-closed 
                                                     
4 Based on this harmonised definition, a loan is qualified as non-performing when it is 90 days past-
due or unlikely to be paid without collateral realisation. Moreover, all exposures to a debtor should 
be considered non-performing when 20% of the exposures to a debtor are 90 days past-due. 
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real estate and initiating a scheme to facilitate the securitisation of NPLs. The impact of these 
measures that partially only apply to new NPLs remains to be seen, but they will definitely 
require some time before becoming effective. The value of the NPLs therefore remains 
uncertain. 
In recent years the main issue was that the number of NPLs surged; the current issue is that 
the value of the NPLs is decreasing as a result of the increasing NPLs in the Italian banking 
sector. MPS is suffering more from this also relative to other Italian banks, since the NPL 
portfolio is about twice the size of other Italian banks or one-third of its customer loan 
portfolio. The overrepresentation of NPLs at MPS seems to be primarily due to lax lending 
policies, more SME customers (who are responsible for most of the bad loans) and less-
efficient capacity to handle bad debts than other banks in the past. Formally, most loans are 
secured through collateral, which consists for most SMEs of machinery and industrial 
buildings, which have very limited value at the moment that the enterprise goes bust. 
The gross value of the NPLs is currently about €50 billion, which is taking the provisions into 
account valued at around 40% in the books of MPS. The market value, according to various 
estimations, is somewhere between 20-40%. The difference is created through the fact that 
book values (IAS/IFRS) are based on cash-flows, while the market values are based on the 
investors’ expected rate of return. MPS has been summoned by the ECB to accelerate the 
unwinding of its NPL portfolio. The sales of the NPLs will urge MPS to accept the difference 
between the book and the currently lower uncertain market values.  
In addition, the supervisor might impose additional capital charges in response to the 2016 
stress test results. Contrary to the previous stress tests, the results of this year’s stress test will 
not be expressed in a shortfall but will be used to inform the Supervisory Review and 
Evaluation Process (SREP). Based on the SREP, supervisors may decide to require some 
individual banks to hold additional capital. For MPS, the ECB as direct supervisor needs to 
determine whether the bank needs to hold additional capital. The stress test itself, however, 
is not the appropriate tool to determine legacy losses, since it looks at the impact of a 
hypothetical stress scenario on future earnings. The additional capital required for MPS 
should therefore be determined differently. 
Extensive recapitalisation 
The competent authorities should compel MPS to stop living on the edge, which is very costly 
for the society. Hence, as the example of MPS has shown, banks that are closer to failing are 
prone to take more risk, attempt to hide or postpone losses and are less likely to function as a 
financer of the real economy. Moreover, these banks are more likely to need public funds and 
form a threat to financial stability. The supervisory authority should therefore insist that 
banks like MPS that are performing poorly in multiple stress tests or close to the capital 
thresholds when applied are subject to a more thorough review. In addition, more supervisory 
scrutiny is also required when the bank is over exposed to certain activities or risks that are 
not well captured in the stress test, such as legacy losses. In the case of MPS, for example, the 
supervisor could use its discretionary powers to undertake a detailed assessment to determine 
the current market value of the loan book in combination with a stress test to create a large 
degree of certainty that the bank will survive without support in case the situation 
deteriorates. 
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The Italian solution 
MPS might, however, not be able to raise sufficient private funds through the ordinary 
channels (e.g. issue shares, sell assets, etc.). Based on various recent media reports, the 
European Commission will accept the call from the Italian authorities to consider the current 
situation an ‘exceptional circumstance’ based on the post-Brexit referendum market turmoil. 
This will allow the Italian government to avoid a bail-in and open the door to a bail-out of 
MPS, as it did in 2009 and 2012. The Italian authorities seems to want this solution to avoid a 
politically sensitive bail-in of creditors, including Italian households, which would be 
required under the resolution procedure. The proposal that the Italian government and the 
banking association seem to be pushing foresees a limited bail-in of only subordinated debt 
holders and some asset-relief measures that will be potentially ‘government’-sponsored using 
the publicly initiated and bank-funded Atlante fund. The fund would then be used, for 
example, to acquire the NPLs from MPS. For this scenario to unfold, the government would 
have to provide a guarantee to allow the fund to leverage to a size sufficient to acquire the 
NPLs. 
Bail-in 
The concerns of the Italian government and others about the bail-in of retail customers might 
be exaggerated due to the focus on the exceptions. A closer look at the households’ holdings 
of Italian bank bonds shows that the large majority of the bail-inable instruments are held by 
the wealthiest Italian households, which should have been able to assess the risks of such 
instruments and absorb the losses, if any. Hence, according to a survey by the Italian central 
bank, about 6% of Italian households hold non-equity instruments eligible for bail-in. More 
than 85% of the bail-in instruments are held by the 10% wealthiest Italian households. 
Accounting for around 40% of total financial assets, bank bonds form with an important part 
of the wealth of these households. Looking at all households, the share of subordinated bonds 
(0.7% of household wealth) and senior unsecured bonds (4.3%) is responsible for only about 
5% of household wealth. Deposits above €100,000, representing 5.6% of total assets, form the 
largest share of household wealth that could potentially be subject to bail-in (Banca d’Italia, 
2015; D’Alessio & Faiella, 2002).  
Moreover, one should not forget that bail-in does not necessarily mean that debt-investors 
lose their money. The bailed-in debt-investors will receive shares in the resolved MPS in 
return for the debt instruments that are converted from debt into equity. The book value of 
these instruments should be equal to the value of the debt instrument at the moment of 
issuance, as long as the losses are not larger than the pre-bail in equity. The latter would mean 
that the debt-investors that are being bailed-in are not only providing capital, but are also 
bearing part of the losses. The price of the securities might drop straight after the issuance, 
due to uncertainty about the performance of the bank and also in most cases unfavourable 
market conditions, but it might afterwards recover and even end up above the notional value 
of the converted securities once the performance of the bank improves and the markets calm 
down. 
Notwithstanding that there might be no loss, some of the bail-in instruments have been sold 
to customers that were not made aware of the riskiness of the instruments. In these cases of 
mis-selling, the customers should in the first instance be compensated by either the issuing or 
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the selling party. Since these parties will in many cases be unable to provide the required 
funds because they lack sufficient funds or are already bankrupt/resolved at the moment that 
the claim is made, it is important that conduct-of-business supervisors closely follow the sales 
practises of the bail-inable instruments of banks. In particular, the supervisors should ensure 
that clients are well informed, take the risk-profile into account and are encouraged to 
diversify their portfolios. It might already be too late in the case of MPS, and if so, the 
resolution authority could exempt these investors from bail-in or the government might chose 
to compensate some of the smaller investors itself.  
The European solution 
The Italian solution would mean that taxpayers’ money would again be exposed to the 
banking sector, whereas recovering and resolving distressed banks without resort to 
taxpayers’ money is one of the main objectives of the new European recovery and resolution 
scheme. Moreover, the use of a fund like Atlante, which is funded by other banks, is also not 
recommended owing to its heightened systemic risk. In the short-run the public-private 
solution through the Atlante fund might reduce the uncertainty on the sustainability of MPS 
and other Italian banks that reduce their NPLs, but it might also distort the level-playing field, 
i.e. Italian banks seem to get a preferential treatment compared to banks in other countries. In 
the longer run it might further lead to extra risk-taking and prolong the bank-government 
embrace, which could trigger a future crisis. The supervisory, resolution and competition 
authorities should therefore impose the standard procedure as foreseen in the resolution 
scheme with a bail-in to cover the losses and arrange the recapitalisation. In case it faces some 
obstacles in the execution of the bail-in (e.g. cross-holdings of bail-in instruments by banks, 
mis-selling of subordinated debt instruments to retail customers, unclear marking of bail-in 
instruments), the resolution authority could use its discretionary powers to prioritise certain 
creditors in resolution to ensure a smooth execution of the bail-in, with the precondition that 
no-creditor is worse off than in case of liquidation. Finally, the authorities should use these 
experiences to correct the weaknesses in the resolution framework (e.g. cross-holding of bail-
in instruments, excluding politically sensitive exposures), improve ongoing work (e.g. 
recovery and resolution plans, setting MREL-levels) and to prepare for future resolution cases 
(e.g. sufficiently high recapitalisation). 
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Annex Table 1. Overview of results MPS’ in cross-border stress tests, 2009-2016 
Name EU-Wide Stress 
Testing Exercise 
2010 EU-Wide 
Stress Testing 
Exercise 
2011 EU-wide 
stress test 
EU Capital 
exercise 2011 
EU Capital 
exercise 2011 
final results 
2014 EU-wide 
stress test 
Comprehensive 
assessment 
2016 EU-wide 
stress test 
Leading supervisor CEBS CEBS EBA EBA EBA EBA ECB EBA 
Disclosure date results 01/10/2009 23/07/2010 15/07/2011 08/12/2011 03/10/2012 26/10/2014 26/10/2014 29/07/2016 
Type Stress test Stress test Stress test Capital exercise Capital exercise Stress test 
(Stress test)/ 
Asset quality 
review 
Stress test 
Scope of exercise 
Cut-off date Dec-2008 Dec-2009 Dec-2010 Sept-2011 June-2012 Dec-2013 Dec-2013 Dec-2015 
Stress years 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 .. .. 2014-2016 .. 2016-2018 
Capital threshold (adverse) 4% Tier 1 6% Tier 1 5% Core Tier 1 9% Core Tier 1 9% Core Tier 1 5.5% Core Tier 1 5.5% Core Tier 1 .. 
Stresses Macro-economic Macro-economic Macro-economic Sovereign 
exposures 
Sovereign 
exposures Macro-economic .. Macro-economic 
Results Monte Dei Paschi di Siena 
Capital at cut-off date N/A 
7.5% 
[€ 9.1 bn] 
5.8% 
[€ 6.3 bn] 
9.2% 
[€ 10.0 bn] 
10.8% 
[€ 10.4 bn] 
7.0%** 
[€ 5.7 bn] 
10.2% 
[€ 8.5 bn] 
12.8% 
[€ 8.5 bn CET1] 
Impact baseline scenario N/A +0.1% +0.3% 
-3.2% -3.6% 
+0.6% -4.2% +0.0% 
Impact adverse scenario N/A -1.3%* -1.1% -7.1% -10.3% -14.2% 
Shortfall N/A 
+0.2%  
[€ +0.2 bn] 
+1.3%  
[€ +1.4 bn]*** 
-3.0%  
[€ -3.3 bn] 
-1.8%  
[€ -1.7 bn] 
-5.6%  
[€ -4.3 bn] 
..**** 
* Including sovereign shock. 
** The capital at cut-off date for the EBA’s 2014 stress test included already the value adjustments of the asset quality review of the ECB.  
*** Despite 0.3% [€ -0.4 bn] shortfall, not reported as such because of 1.6% [€ 1.8 bn] capital raised during course of exercise.  
**** Since there is no official threshold in the 2016 stress test, there was also no capital shortfall reported. 
Sources: Author’s elaboration on CEBS (2009), ECB (2014), EBA (2010-16), and Ayadi & De Groen (2014). 
